


THE EISENHOWER LIBRARY




3 1151 02672 3514

Library



The Johns Hopkins University















THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THEORY OF ALGEBRA

1960

1

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Board of University Studies

of the

University of Chicago

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

JOHN H. H. H.











The whole of "Grace" seems to be before we have cried "A. I.", therefore, we are to make an intelligent search for belief in judgment, we must first fix upon what is generally conceived to be its nature. Moreover, should belief be found in judgment; if it does for judgment what we have assumed; if, that is, it shows that thinking has for its whole business the "illumination of the particular phenomenon of investigation;"<sup>o</sup> then, it implies a reference to reality, and means at the same time the satisfaction of some inner demand--some demand of the ego. Now, indeed, would it alter abstract, barren thought to find it contained belief, if belief had its whole being in an immediate experience? It would afford no proof that thought accedes to itself to previous experience, and is not made up of static universals that keep all of from developing nature. Were it all told when we say that belief is a feeling or sensation, then, belief would have no significance in judgment one way or the other, either rationally or empirically.

Be that that the investigation whether belief is an element in judgment, led thus to wait upon an investigation into the real nature and conditions of belief, demanded a certain method of procedure. It was necessary first to go through the literature on the subject (both the historical and psychological--including under the latter, general, pathological, and experimental) and to search with unceasing scrutiny for the works that most persistently identified themselves with belief; to be rob, indeed, for the works that escaped most sieves of criticism, and that come ultimately to be held by a majority of writers. The next thing to do, in accordance with our method, was to take account of the qualities or conditions which history and psychology had decided to be indispensable to belief,

<sup>o</sup> Hibben, "The Philosophical Aspects of Ideality,"  
Philosophical Review, March, 1914.





and see if there were such as would make belief have any vital bearing upon judgment. A criticism and comparison of the results obtained in this review of theories, revealed a number of conditions confirming our investigation; the burden of evidence indicated that belief--whatever other attributes it might have--is therefore an objective reference to reality, and a subjective reference to self.

An epistemological study of the development of the belief-consciousness further corroborated the double nature of belief, and at the same time led up to a leading argument for the co-ordination of judgment and belief. In its first mode, belief appears as reality-feeling; consciousness is here a-dualistic, and flows on in unthinking presumption that all is as it seems. But after a time contrary conditions bring disappointment and doubt, and reality-feeling is displaced by unreality-feeling. Consciousness breaks up into a dualism of the inner and outer, and objects, being no longer immediate, as they were in the earlier a-dualistic experience, the individual must seek a new criterion of reality. To do this, he resorts to experimentation or schematism, a process of the imagination which makes it possible for consciousness to give to an object a meaning beyond what it already has. In this power of the psychic to release objects from their sense-control, and thus to develop their possibilities, is seen, in emphatic distinctness, that inner active nature which an object can't satisfy before there is an expression of belief. And true to its double nature, belief does not yet appear in this mode, where the object is only assumed; instead, we have quasi-belief.

Having found that reality-feeling is coincided with presumption and quasi-belief with assumption, it was next a question of belief and judgment: Are they joined together? To answer this question in the affirmative, there would have to appear in judgment both in ob-



factive and subjective of matter. In other words, if we accept my  
 to investigate judgment both as to its existence-factor and as to a  
 personal factor.

That judgment has an existential reference, was found to be at-  
 tested by increasing argument; argument, too, that it opens to several  
 points of view. It is supported by Baldwin from the genetic and  
 epistemological point of view; by Meinong, from a semi-genetic and  
 epistemological; by Bradley, from the logical; and by Brentano, from  
 the psychological. That the personal factor abides in judgment,  
 as it does in belief, and appears in judgment as personal indorsement  
 and is never submerged into content that is without covation or inter-  
 est, is evidenced most emphatically by the pragmatic content, which  
 tends throughout to specify the personal element in judgment; and  
 also, by recent worth-theory, which finds a residue of an evaluating  
 nature that the concept cannot render.

As a final argument that judgment embodies in overt expression  
 the dull nature of belief, a short criticism is made of bare cognition,  
 the emptiness of which is easily explained upon this theory; and a  
 longer criticism of pragmatism, which especially supports the view  
 of this paper; for, in failing to reach belief, the pragmatist also  
 fails to reach judgment, thus stopping at what Meinong, Brentano  
 and Baldwin call assumption.



section 4: "Belief as a state of mind."

But it is not the mere "belief," that "belief as a state of mind related to or associated with a present time sign," will be lost quickly, as well as most clearly brought out if we begin by setting forth the author's point of view. Perhaps the leading characteristic of Hume's philosophy is his skepticism; in any rate, he must be certain that in his treatment of belief, this is his leader. Reason is declared to be ineffectual as soon as it pretends upon its supposed authority; it is then no longer able to produce conviction. Outside of demonstrative and intuitive propositions, there is no such thing as certain knowledge. As soon as we attempt to gain truth inductively, we land in the bog of "matter of fact,"<sup>9</sup> where knowledge can find no footing, and belief goes down in doubt. Reason is divided to skepticism, and in spite of herself, she will give aid to her rival. The relation between belief and reason, as Hume regarded it, is well put in the following passage: "When I reflect on the natural fallibility of my judgments, I have no less confidence in my opinions than when I only consider the objects concerning which I reason; and when I proceed still further to turn the scrutiny against every successive estimate I make of my faculties, all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last, a total extinction of belief and evidence."<sup>(+)</sup>

This brief consideration of the fundamental description of Hume's system of philosophy brings us without surprise,--in fact, pretty much as a matter of course, to the statement that belief is not demonstrable, is not a state of mind "grounded in evidence." The more thought strives after judgments that give conviction of truth, the less the conviction grows. For a standard reference to this

<sup>9</sup> Hume: "A Treatise of Human Nature," p. 116. (+) *ibid.*, 117.





















































## Section IV: Belief as Action.

Whether it is that new facts are ever coming above the horizon of human experience, and indeed, of reality, and confounding old theories; or simply that the facts existing are of too vast a number (even the representative ones) to be brought within the ken of a single life, is a question that is again in mind as we come to the study of Alexander Bain. Phenomena that ought to be classed under belief were running wild beyond the confines of "sentiment or feeling," or of "inseparable association," or even of "ultimate assent." It was Bain's ambition to project a theory that would be thoroughly comprehensive. He accordingly declared that at bottom, belief is action; "action is the basis and ultimate criterion of reality."<sup>o</sup>

To say with James Mill that conviction is an association of ideas, is to reduce belief, Bain argued, to a mental state that is ultra-rational and static; it is to forget that belief is a motor phenomenon, and that it expresses itself in attitude or movement; it is to make the mistake of thinking to find a true resultant when one component, and that, the main one, is left out. The correct view of the question is to be had from the side, not of antecedent, but of consequent. We have the clue to the real character of belief in the connection between thought and work. "The practical test applied to a man's belief in a certain matter is his acting upon it."<sup>(+)</sup> This theory is of the nature and origin of linear assurance, explaining it as it is by the working of our own experience, not likewise the need for an a priori principle, whether that principle be a lively idea or an ultimate assent.

<sup>o</sup> Bain: *The Emotions and the Will*: 4th edition, 'p. 106.

<sup>(+)</sup> *Ibid.* 502.



Bain's position leads here to the third conviction which he-- or does--manifest in an outward action, if the existing situation permits; it is readily learned from actual; it means that there is no conviction without its essence in an accompanying, though of course it is not immediately action, however remote or indirect. The latter may be. "If I am thirsty, I say so, and I believe myself to be thirsty, because I act accordingly; I can assure myself or any other person that I do not desire a drink, so if I feel, or a hallucination, in any of these cases, a sense of voluntary exertion corresponding to the supposed sensation."<sup>9</sup> The author's determination of pure action indispensable to belief appears still more boldly in a second case. He believes that he yesterday ran up against a wall to keep out of the way of a carriage. There is no disposition to do anything in consequence of this memory, yet, it is a conviction. And this because, says Bain, "I feel that if there were any likelihood of being jammed up in that spot again, I should not go that way if I could help it."<sup>(+)</sup> It is a readiness to act that makes belief "something more than fancy." Even the conviction that obtains in the highest theoretical knowledge is amenable to the action-theory. The reason for such knowledge is seldom reduced to action is "not want of faith, but want of opportunity."<sup>10</sup>

Such signs as we have found Bain laying upon the action element in belief is almost enough to eclipse from the view other elements (or elements) if they have; assurance attaches to voluntary activity; it attaches also to spontaneous activity. "Our natural state of mind; our primitive start, is tantamount to full confidence;" "In its

<sup>9</sup> Emotions and the Will: 4th edition, p. 508. (+) *ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *ibid.* p. 507













Chapter III.

Paragraph 1.

The first part of the document is a general introduction to the subject of the study. It discusses the importance of the research and the objectives of the study. The second part of the document is a detailed description of the methodology used in the study. This includes a description of the data sources, the data collection methods, and the data analysis methods. The third part of the document is a discussion of the results of the study. This includes a description of the findings and a discussion of the implications of the findings. The fourth part of the document is a conclusion and a list of references.

Section I: Description of Paragraph 1.

A) Further description of Paragraph 1.

Further description of Paragraph 1. This section provides a more detailed description of the methodology used in the study. It discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, and the data analysis methods. It also discusses the results of the study and the implications of the findings.

Further description of Paragraph 1. This section provides a more detailed description of the methodology used in the study. It discusses the data sources, the data collection methods, and the data analysis methods. It also discusses the results of the study and the implications of the findings.



"etc.

casts, "where the subject is to control a kind, for instance, will be proved to be one of the ineluctable of human emotions." I read, some such view of assurance seems necessary to explain the tenacity or burning certainty of those convictions that assert the value after the intellectual incentive is gone, or that transcend that incentive. Only thus could the writer himself account for the fact that he still remained susceptible to the conviction that he should be "reluctant" "ridiculous," when years had passed since his defeat. And only thus can we account for such conduct as that of Caliph Omar, who burnt the Alexandrian library upon the flimsy pretext that, "All books which contain what is not in the Koran are dangerous; all those which contain what is in the Koran are useless."

The writer thinks his position, that belief is not "a purely intellectual matter," further established by our experience in dreams "where we are always believing, but scarcely ever arguing;" and by the abnormal belief that the insane suffer as fixed illusions, a belief that has a degree of intensity never realized by the sane. But the argument he makes the most of in this connection is that by which he endeavors to show that our main ideas possess of themselves the power to generate assurance without the exercise of the intellectual process; the ideas, namely, that are clear, or intense, or constant, or interesting. These ideas are designated as tendencies to inculcational conviction and adhesive states of consciousness.

These four groups of ideas, moreover, give B. the basis of attack on Bain's sweeping assertion that belief is identical with our "activity or active disposition," and support his assumption that children are born believing, and become skeptical only with the check and dimming of wants of food, rest, acquiescence, and pleasure. Doubt is defined as "a situation (in these ideas) produced by conflict-





sion." This collision, however, does not fully conform to the standard against these invidious ideas, and that, as noted in even the most recent, best-selling stage, "vestiges of our primitive, all-believing past."

Miss Ethel Staehle, in "A Critical Study," entitled, "The Will to Believe as a Basis for a Defense of Religious Faith,"<sup>9</sup> quoting Frede Van Campenhout, says: "There are two possible ways for a research into the conditions of belief. One may start with a fixed definition of the real, and then proceed from it with a search for ideas that show in order to be characterized as real; or, one may proceed inductively, and search for the common qualities of those ideas which are generally believed, and thus determine the nature of reality." She then goes on to say that James attempts to carry through the record of these methods. A deeper observation is to serve as well as it is true. For to gain any conception of Professor James' treatment of belief without first placing one's self on the side of an Ego (the common-sense Ego), so one can see what ideas it chooses as real, would be a thing as impossible as undertaking to make the cart pull the horse; because the force that decides reality is not external, but internal.

But even with this suggestion to guide the reader through the chapter on the "Perception of Reality," (+) he yet meets with difficulties. One such perplexity is as to how the experience of doubt could ever arise to vex the Ego, if the Ego decided the truth of things wholly by the postulate of its own inner nature. It is quite natural for the new-born mind to turn the hallucinatory candle into a reality, since there is no other object present in conscious-

<sup>9</sup> Archives of Philosophy, edited by Frederick J. J. Woodbridge, No. 2, December, 1906; p. 64.

(+) James: Principles of Psychology; vol. II, p. 381.



ness to protest. The child is quite different from the adult as grown-  
 up and steady, and equally confident of his child's "logical" and  
 conceit; the tables are even turned. And it is in such a child only such  
 a situation that the conventional tendency to accept of the position  
 applying to the growing, there is required. It is a child's. Fur-  
 ther and the danger of passive acceptance is the least of the  
 emotions or of the nature, the child no longer trusts everything;  
 about some things he takes a second thought. Without recognizing  
 stubborn controlling facts or resistances, it is a mystery why the  
 boy with his winged horse should ever meet with contradicting con-  
 ditions. Indeed, Professor James, as Miss Stettheimer asserts, does  
 seem almost forced to declare for space-reality, a world existing  
 simply to have something for belief to go out upon. She refers to  
 the passage in the Principles of Psychology where he speaks of "the  
 candle existing "over there.....(in) space, related to other  
 candles."<sup>o</sup> And following this out logically, one could say of the  
 illusory candle that it became unreal for the experience having it,  
 only when it was found not to exist in real space alongside of other  
 candles.

If, however, there are times when the author's presentation of  
 belief as the "mental state, or function of reality,"<sup>(+)</sup> tries com-  
 prehension even beyond its capacity, there are other times, and many  
 of them, when the understanding goes along with facility. The con-  
 sideration of belief as an emotion furnishes an example of the latter.  
 In this, James agrees with Parehot, and says that "in its true  
 nature, belief, or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling allied  
 to the emotion more than to anything else."<sup>@</sup> But it is concerning

<sup>o</sup> p. 39. <sup>(+)</sup> *ibid.* 243. <sup>@</sup> *ibid.*



the circumstances "in which we think things real," the Professor James carries on most of his investigations; for about all that can be said of belief as the "sense of reality," is that it is a state of consciousness and sentiment, a feeling that feels like itself. How important a part is accorded the emotions in the matter of conviction may be seen from two or three quotations. "Emotion excites the will in the natural man carries credence with it." "The whole history of witchcraft and medicine is a commentary on the facility with which anything which chances to be conceived is believed the moment the belief chimes in with the emotional mood." "Belief consists in the emotional reaction of the entire man upon an object." Mere appearance, bare appeal to the intellect, is not enough to "sting" us with assurance. In order to move us to belief, an object must be interesting and important; it must come to the mind, as Home said, as a lively and active idea. This is attested by "our everlasting partiality to the sense-world, or the world of our practical life." (+) When, at their height, emotions lead us to believe the first thing that comes to mind, we have a fact instanced by the unreasoned conviction of the soul.

In the first paragraph of this brief review of James' theory of belief, it was said that the only way to express the author's meaning is by way of the Em. Let us then adopt that course. We are immediately met with the assertion that the "fons et origo of all reality is the Self." While Stout and Baldwin posit two controls, inner activity and outer limitation, James would place the whole matter in the hands of one control--the Self. He might be considered as saying in Shakesperian style, "It is not in our objects, but in ourselves

\* Principles of Psychology, p. 286 ff.

(+) *ibid.*, 297 ff.



that a "revelation." "Of course, the 'revelation' is in nature, and not in ourselves; more precisely it is revealed at birth."° This perspective of the Epicureans is the climax at the end of the chapter on "Perception of Reality," and belief too will amount to being only the same thing as seeing. "Will and Belief," in short, maintain a certain relation between self and the Self, are the names for one and the same psychological phenomenon."(+)

The only difference between them is physiological; which seems to mean that in both these phenomena there is a "contact" to the existence of the object, a turning to it in an interested, active, emotional way, but that in Will there is added a new physiological element, that of effort.

Professor James summarizes his whole position in one short sentence, as follows: "The most compendious possible formula, perhaps, would be that our belief and attention are the same fact."@ He offers this definition with the hope of incorporating into a single view all the earlier views that persist each by virtue of a certain truth, but a partial truth; the view of James Mill, of Bain and of Sully. "For the moment, what we attend to is reality; attention is a motor reaction, and we are so made that sensations force attention from us."

B) belief with Attention as an indispensable element.

As representative of those who consider that belief can exist only on some kind of cognitive basis, we shall examine the views of Sully, Stout and Fiddin alone. These writers, coming at the problem from two different directions, bring in evidence from both the un-

° Principles of Psychology: vol. ii, p. 317. (+) *ibid.* p. 311.  
 @ *ibid.* p. 322.





lytic and ideational forces, which in their differentiation, are able to present apprehensions of a definite. And for this, belief has experientially a reference to an extra-mental reality, to a reality beyond the mere ideas that are in consciousness; belief for these and its roots, at least its roots, in the representative-ness of knowledge. They do not say, however, that belief is knowledge and nothing else; that it has no intrinsic nature of its own, but is wholly a reflection of knowledge; they contend only that belief and cognition operate always in conjunction. This view does not underestimate conviction in its interactive nature; its impulse, its propelling spontaneity, its character as the focal expression of all that is creative in conscious life; its simple lives upon which conviction can support itself. If belief were a subject out of its own nature, then there would be neither object nor belief, for all would be an objectless immediacy.

Sully's point of view toward belief is best set forth in his work, "Sensation and Intuition," in the chapter, "Belief: Its Variations and its Conditions." In this chapter he takes up the subject in an acute and exhaustive manner, working out, perhaps, the most complete psychological research yet made in this field. His primary assumption is that "every idea involves a mental impulse to realize the corresponding sensation," and that this psychic fact is the last "irreducible stage" in the history of belief.<sup>o</sup> By notable skill in choosing pertinent illustrations, he is able to marshal an array of evidence sufficient to turn his assumption into a very credible theory. The experience of certainty has thus, even in its best form, an objective work or condition. Also, he

<sup>o</sup> Sully: Sensation and Intuition, p. 17.



promise of a... effective development expressed by... in  
 these words: "To believe is not to believe in an object; it is only  
 to do this, a definite idea of the thing believed in is essential."<sup>o</sup>  
 Owing to this, he says that "the nature of the object believed in is  
 a condition in part, and a necessary part, of what is called  
 belief."<sup>(+)</sup>

That the essence of cognition is a presupposed condition of  
 some kind or evidence of conviction, becomes more and more charac-  
 teristic as belief, rather than of mere objects, develops, i.e., as the  
 character develops from simple expectation and collective  
 anticipation to logical conviction. An experience unfolds in growth,  
 it defines, differentiates and qualifies itself; features that were  
 at first vague and indistinct become marked and positive. If we  
 trace briefly the genetic development of belief in the  
 chapter referred to, we shall see results that show the relation  
 between knowing and believing to be very intimate.

We remember an earlier statement of the author's assumption with  
 respect to the origin of human certainty and confidence: "Every idea  
 involves a mental impulse to realize the corresponding sensation."  
 But it may be well to emphasize another: "Belief arises," he says,  
 "from the inherent tendency of the idea to approximate in character  
 and intensity to the sensation of which it is the offspring."<sup>@</sup> "In  
 the instinctive transitional stage from a recurring idea to an  
 actual sensation, qualified by it, there seem to present themselves  
 the first awkward, but necessary, trials of human faith."<sup>(#)</sup> A  
 simple and unimportant tendency to believe in an idea, but it is at least  
 to the idea as a sort of craving for the "real" which the idea itself  
 does not, but craves for to have. And that is what a thing is  
 a fact is strikingly attested, as Gull's judgment, by the concept

-----  
 (#) ...  
 @ Same ...  
 (+) ...



of his world, of children, of a life and of a world's view  
 never. The power and ability to do all things; to do what the  
 child would like for his parents. And the same is the child's  
 intellectual personal life, to express a world and a life of an  
 item. Conditions of mind and in a child's life can be found  
 only in a child's life, by some day, such as an article,  
 owned in early life of a child, and the child's personal  
 view of a life are not far from that of an individual. At this im-  
 portant point, we are told, consciousness is not yet fully objecti-  
 fied his experiences; not divided space and time into a series of  
 points of reference; not even made the fixed divisions of past and  
 future; past and present; actual and possible.

To this direct level of belief, Bain collected, and criticized  
 Sully for not taking account of the order and sequence in retrospec-  
 tions which the former thinks essentials, and concludes of all as-  
 surances. It is true that to think of an experience having none of  
 those logical ordering characteristics, is to think of an experience set  
 apart, so to speak, without any bearings. But that may be for the  
 reason that we are looking back from the high ground of logical or-  
 ganization. At any rate, Sully maintained that these "bearings" take  
 on definite character only with the further development of experi-  
 ence; only, that is, with the arrival of anticipation and its conse-  
 quent disappointment. And certainly that argument is difficult of  
 refutation. It holds that disappointed expectation precedes and  
 provokes reflection upon the past, upon the relation of antecedent  
 to consequent. As long as the child is not deceived in his expecta-  
 tions, but always finds an object the thing his ideas pictured, just  
 so long is he going to be ignorant of sequence in nature, and ignorant  
 in his ignorance. It is only when the orders prove to be, not an  
 order, but a pointed fall, which is not constituted of things, but



that the child begins to scrutinize its shape, color, texture and other attributes. "Noticing that the fulfillment of credulous expectation will drive the young child to consider the basis of its definite anticipation, and thus the incentive to look for the deeper conditions of antecedent and consequent, which I have called the concrete of assurance." It alone will awaken the "receptive faculty or intuition," which is another word for insight (beyond disorganized) in transforming our first over-eager grasp into deliberate conclusions of reason, and which transforms the indeterminate, formless world into a world having all the form and meaning given by the most enterprising of co-existence, sequence and parallel existence.

Our study of James Gully thus far may be summarized by saying that belief demands as the necessary condition of its advent into life, some rudimentary experience, "more especially some sensation," (+) and that this meager experience becomes in a future belief, definite, objective fact, existing for presentiation as permanent, independent object. This in psychological belief is the same as ideological. "Belief is a proposition," he says, "in which belief is its truth; that is, in its correspondence with the actual relation of things." But the question he wants to raise now is, What of inseparable association, emotion, action-edges Gully's belief? Is it a condition of belief? The answer is yes; he does, but not as independent conditions. He accepts J. S. Mills' criticism of inseparable association (3) as an attempt to force a connection between independent functions) as just identified as belief, its condition. He concludes thus: "The mode of its (belief's) origin, the differential nature of

• Human Mind: p. 77. @ Outlines of Psychology, p. 77.

(+) Human Mind, p. 41.





its objects, and that it holds a causal relation to all the emotions produced by it, and, therefore, it is a necessary term to it."° With respect to the relation of belief to action, to account for all known convictions, it is not true that belief is in some instances a direct cause of action, but is explained on the basis of action; as, for example, the case when the expectation of conviction becomes painful or tender. The notion itself of belief is not to be found in feeling, emotion or action; belief is ultimate. Feeling and action, however, have an effect or assurance, but not directly; only indirectly, through ideas, which all have a direct bearing upon conviction. Completely and completely out, belief at its full includes forth in action intellectual presentation, feeling and active impulse, and if it be of the ideal kind, also a certain amount of a spiritual will.

Stout undertakes an exploration of belief from an analytical point of view, and works out a theory of the "direct". This theory is sufficiently comprehensive to include both the action-theory of Bain and the association theory of James Mill. Bain held that the "relation of belief to activity is expressed by saying that we believe, we act upon." This Stout approves. There is no question that a confident state of mind tends to express itself in action; conviction and activity are really correlated to each other. Bain's mistake was not that he made his theory too sweeping, but that he did not make it sweeping enough. Limiting action to phenomena extrinsic to the mind was where he made his mistake. "He considers only kinds of muscular movements, producing a corresponding series of effects in the material environment. But even when such things exist, the

° See *Logic and Psychology*: p. 100.











#5.

ent. They are on the side of the available. I think, of course, would be an impossibility but for the constraints which set us up by nature, requiring, definitely, to reach a definite end. It is as much a truth that we do not experience subjectively a freedom of limited conditions as it is that we cannot walk without walking upon something. "The steps of a journey, first, are always small, and fixed in their locality of place. In devising means to an end, therefore, we are not free to make what will conditions we will."°

Limitation of subjective activity, then, as we are distinctly told, is an indispensable factor in assurance. But what does this imply? Now, belief leads to action, we know, but here the situation is reversed, and belief follows action. The answer, however, is not difficult. By the limitative, or passive aspect of truth, is meant simply the recognition of an objective control. The control by which we lay hold of the means, and bring ourselves to a desired end is an inner control; but the control which makes us consider means, bringing us up with us when we neglect such considerations, and which early convinces credulous natures that "wisdom is not giving," that control is outer. But outer does not mean something that is foreign to our subjective experience; on the contrary, it is a very present fact, which asserts its rights both to presentation and representation, directly, as sense objects, or indirectly, as determining ideas.

"The limitation of subjective activity," the author writes, "may take two distinct forms. We find ourselves forced to think in a given manner, in spite of an attempt to think otherwise. In this case, the limitation is an actual opposition or obstruction. This

° Analytical Psychology: vol. ii, p. 239.

















with the feeling of present reality: "Present reality is not reality, manifested; it is a representation of reality; and reality is not reality, manifested by reality, but by itself."\*

For the feeling of reality, felt as if by an object, is needed by disapproval of the self. It seems possible that "belief and self-consciousness" might seem to have a certain sense as only with discarded expectations, and with the development of the executive faculty, or faculty of action. To say that belief follows, that is, after its development, is to say that the "feeling of belief is a feeling that at once to be a representative faculty primarily." (+) The self-will that once trusted everything and everything, having been received once too often, has turned skeptical, and mere impressions and ideas are no longer directly accepted as having sufficient credentials in their own immediate presence; they must support their claim by a reliable object, or by directly convincing the senses. And if they can satisfy the requirements, can witness the case of facts, and a new candidate enters the field of reality. To represent exactly what you can imagine, and to believe in the basis of doubt and its solution, to believe that one can be extended. We should have to consider consciousness, not only as passing upon the eligibility of impressions and ideas, but as being in part of that such "real as a thing" as a promise of a promise. How can such a promise come, applying the meaning of Dr. Baldwin's theory may be seen by comparing it with the most complete definition of belief: "Belief is a state of consciousness of the presence of a thing which it is difficult to deny."\*

\* Self and Will, . . . . (+) . . . . © 1916 . . . .

















by an idea, ... (The text is extremely faint and largely illegible. It appears to be a handwritten or typed document with significant fading or bleed-through. The words are difficult to discern but seem to follow a narrative or descriptive structure.)

With the ... (This section continues the text, which remains largely illegible due to the same quality issues as the first section. The structure appears to be a continuous paragraph or a series of related points.)

















plene... I... of the...  
 "the...  
 er...  
 it, the...  
 will be...  
 till if...  
 "Me...  
 er...  
 er...  
 Or". (+) Now, Me...  
 of...  
 and not...  
 It is...  
 The...  
 are...  
 hesitating, ...  
 certainty, ...  
 certainty, ...  
 Reusssteins...  
 H...  
 aspect...  
 This...  
 "real" ...  
 to have...  
 to be...  
 of the...

The question of attitude (Reusssteinslage) thus narrowing itself

\* Experimental Psychology of the ...

(+) ...



























































... "I have been thinking about you a great deal lately, and wondering how you are getting on. I hope you are well and happy. I have been very busy lately, but I will try to write to you more often. (+)

... The first thing I noticed when I stepped out of the plane was the fresh air. It felt like I had been in a cocoon for a long time. The sun was shining brightly, and the birds were chirping. I had never felt so alive before. I had been thinking about you a great deal lately, and wondering how you are getting on. I hope you are well and happy. I have been very busy lately, but I will try to write to you more often. (+)

... I have been thinking about you a great deal lately, and wondering how you are getting on. I hope you are well and happy. I have been very busy lately, but I will try to write to you more often. (+)





















...; ... "A ...," ... "I ...," ... "If ...": (1) ... (2) ...; ... "While A ...," ... (+)

In the ... of the ... , ... as follows: ... leading ... of ... , ... "pre-discursive" and "post-discursive;" "pre- ... " ... "pre- ... " ... (+)

° loc. cit. supra, p. 20.

(+) Notion: Unter A ... : ...





















Section I: Direct Evidence--

... of the ... evidence ...

To appreciate fully ... evidence ...

\* General Note: vol. 11, p. 111.





















relative transcendence, essentially a relative relative, but that  
not a recognition, a relative of a relative and not a taken  
for itself alone, but a relative of a relative. "It is now  
in the 'is' of a relative of a relative (being itself) as  
one "there is a row."

It is indeed holds to be a relative part of the part, seen  
to be the opinion also of a relative of a relative (in the articles already  
mentioned) and of a relative (in the). Russell in his own words as  
follows: "In fact, relations, attributes and all complexes require  
Objectives, which occur everywhere except in the simple, or speaking  
it quite precisely, in cases of complex individuality where  
presence is. It is always Objectives--i.e., that something should  
exist or should not exist, but would find, and to which we attach  
value."(-) Russell's interpretation is, of course, from the side of  
work, but it is especially in point on account of the fact that the  
side Heiner stands on about the same judgmental basis with him-  
self; which is, as was indicated above, an existential basis. Work  
for itself rests upon some universe of reality, which is presupposed  
in judgement that assert existence, either objectively, hypotetic-  
ally, or disjunctively."

The definition of Bradley's extension with regard to the exist-  
ence-import of the world, we too well known to need more than mere  
verbiage. For Bradley, the realm of ideas that exist only if they  
have something else, such as the decline to experience that is  
rise. These ideas, in fact, signify that consciousness is not that  
from its first state of a relative of a relative, and is the

Heiner: Letter A. p. 11. 116. (+) Letter: 11. 116. 116.  
p. 377. 116. 116.





temptation to claim that it loses its ideal, transferable character, and becomes itself no part of reality; that it is qualitative, not quantitative, and that it is; and to a need to "idealize" the idea or transfer it in its content to a reality which is not itself that ideal. Let us take the content itself, for reality precedes before our idea, just as the water flows out. The subject of the idea is not reality, which is individual and timeless, and which, accordingly, is not and never expressed, but only qualified.

In his action, the judgment cannot get down to mere facts, and it is rather in a way for fact, the qualified content, receives further emphasis from his treatment of these peculiar ideas, the "real" and the "this." "The idea of reality, like the reality of 'this' is not," Bradley states, "a mere formalistic content, to be used without any regard to its existence."<sup>9</sup> These ideas are of facts immediately present to sense; they are elements in our <sup>1</sup> existence, which we encounter directly, and cannot in judgment be removed from this and transferred to another reality. In these instances, the "particular" is present in fact, and it is idle to have an idea of it. This "particular" of presentation--the "real" fact out, first descriptive, cannot exist, and it must therefore look beyond itself for the existence in a content.

Bradley declares for the existential reference of judgment on the grounds of a fundamental distinction between presentation and judgment. They are, he says, intrinsically different classes of psychic elements. "nothing, indeed, is judged, which is not presented, but we maintain that, while the object of a presentation becomes object of an acknowledging or reflecting judgment, consciousness steps into a completely new kind of relation to it. It is then

<sup>9</sup> Bradley: Logic: p. 10.



... "and the ... evidence ... is ..."

... A relative ... evidence ... is ...

Section II: Direct evidence - the ...

... the objective side, there is ... evidence ...

... the ... evidence ... is ...

















in fact, the bare negative would be meaningless, and if it became such judgment would refer to universes of reality that are real existence-spheres, and would be necessarily an expression of some interest. H. W. Johnson, in "An Introduction to Logic (p. 161)." maintains the existential view of judgment, states that there is always a positive character as the ground of negation.

Section IV: Indirect evidence: Argument from Pragmatism.

To come now to the problem whether pragmatism is equally in nature in belief and judgment. It is a fact of common knowledge that the pragmatists do not limit the belief-implication to acquiescence. Take for example James in his "Will to Believe," and Dewey, in his Presidential address (1905), "Beliefs and Habits." In the first, we read that there are "passional tendencies and conditions which run before, and others which come after belief", and it is only the latter that are in a sense for us; and they are not too late if an "American practical workman has already in their own direction." An hypothesis that is living, forced and contentious, we read again, needs "illuminant action," and Dewey declares to mean belief, for "there is always belief in its denotation, there is willingness to act." Belief is, in fact, the "backing of an hypothesis against the field," because "the belief as it is tells us for certain what truths are in our grasp." Dewey is in agreement with these expressions of James, and says that "beliefs are willful; are 'free choices'; are 'acknowledged hypotheses'."

If we turn to the pragmatic theory of judgment, do we not find this same hypothetical character? Judgment is prospective; indeterminate. It is inquiry. Thought is a logical process, but truth is established only as a result of operation; only, that is, as it serves us forward to some end. And this means that truth is a utility.

























#e.

1. I have been thinking about you a lot lately, and I hope you are well. I have been busy with work, but I always find time to think about my friends. I hope you are doing well and that everything is going smoothly for you. I would love to hear from you soon. Give my love to your family. I hope you are all happy and healthy. I will be in touch again soon. Love,  
John















